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Abstract
This paper presents MCDASH, a reﬁnement-based model checker
for machine code. While model checkers such as SLAM, BLAST,
and DASH have each made signiﬁcant contributions in the ﬁeld
of veriﬁcation/ﬂaw-detection, their use has been restricted to pro-
grams for which source code is available. This paper discusses sev-
eral challenges that arisewhen working withmachine code, and ex-
plains how they are addressed in MCDASH. Unlike previous model
checkers, MCDASH does not require the usual preprocessing steps
of (a) building control-ﬂow graphs, and (b) performing points-to
analysis (or alias analysis); nor does MCDASH require type infor-
mation to be supplied. The paper also describes how we extended
MCDASH to check properties of self-modifying code.
MCDASH is built using language-independent meta-tools that
generate the implementations of the required analysis components
from descriptions of an instruction set’s syntax and semantics. It
has been instantiated for Intel x86 and PowerPC.
1. Introduction
Recent research in programming languages, software engineering,
and computer security has led to new kinds of tools for analyzing
programs for bugs and security vulnerabilities [33, 25, 36, 19, 13,
8, 5, 11, 26, 16, 1]. In these tools, program analysis is used to
determine a conservative answer to the question “Can the program
reach a bad state?” Many impressive results have been achieved,
and some of this work has already been transitioned to commercial
products [8, 4, 15, 12].
However, these tools all focus on analyzing source code. Un-
fortunately, most programs that an individual user will install on
his computer, and many commercial off-the-shelf programs that a
company will purchase, are delivered as machine code. If an indi-
vidual or company wishes to vet such programs for bugs, security
vulnerabilities, or malicious code (e.g., back doors, time bombs, or
logic bombs) the availability of good source-code-analysis prod-
ucts is irrelevant. For instance, because device-driver developers
rarely make their source code available, we can only trust that they
have run Microsoft’s Static Driver Veriﬁer (SDV) [4] on their code
and ﬁxed the bugs that were found; we are not in a position to run
SDV ourselves because it does not work on machine code.
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Although establishing execution properties at the machine-code
level is a challenging task, the problem of analyzing machine code
has been receiving increased attention [28, 17, 2, 9, 22, 7]. More-
over, it can be a useful complement to source-code analysis, even
when source code is available:
• The compilation from source code to machine code can intro-
duce subtle but important differences between what a program-
mer intended and what is actually executed by the processor.
However, source-code analyses are blind to the choices made
bythe compiler. Theeffectsof compilation can only bedetected
by examining the machine code emitted by the compiler.
• In addition to the machine code that a programmer creates by
compiling his source code, additional machine code is linked in
either statically or dynamically from libraries. Often the source
code for these libraries is not available, and thus cannot be
analyzed by a source-code-analysis tool. However, a machine-
code-analysis tool can analyze a library’s machine code.
For these reasons, we have developed a model checker for ma-
chine code, called MCDASH. The work on MCDASH addresses
the problem of creating a model checker that is (i) capable of ver-
ifying properties of machine-code programs, and (ii) can be retar-
geted easily to different instruction sets automatically. In particu-
lar, MCDASH is built using language-independent meta-tools that
generate the implementations of the required analysis components
from descriptions of an instruction set’s syntax and semantics. To
date, versions of MCDASH have been instantiated for the Intel x86
and PowerPC instruction sets.
Previous model checkers, such as SLAM [5] (the core com-
ponent of SDV), BLAST [26], MAGIC [10], and DASH [6], have
each made signiﬁcant contributions in the ﬁeld of veriﬁcation/ﬂaw-
detection; however, theirusehasbeen restrictedtosource-code pro-
grams written C. Although C is already quite low-level, there are a
number of issues that arise in the analysis of machine code that are
not handled by the model checkers mentioned above.
Pointers and Types: SLAM, BLAST, and MAGIC use points-
to analysis as a preprocessing step before starting the veriﬁcation
process proper. They rely on the points-to analysis to be efﬁcient
and reasonably precise to get good overall performance. Current
versions of these tools use a ﬂow-insensitive (and possibly ﬁeld-
sensitive) points-to analysis that makes unsound assumptions about
pointer arithmetic—they either ignore pointer arithmetic altogether
(SLAM) or assume that the result of an arithmetic operation on a
pointer isalwayscontained insidetheobject that thepointer pointed
to originally (BLAST and MAGIC).
The latter approach amounts to making an unchecked assump-
tion that the program is ANSI C compliant. The consequence is
that such model checkers do not account for behaviors that are al-
lowed by some compilers (e.g., arithmetic is performed on point-
ers that are subsequently used for indirect function calls; pointers
move off the ends of structs or arrays, and are subsequently deref-
erenced; etc.) There can be good reasons why a program uses such
features—e.g., asaway tosimulate subclassing in C[35]—but they
can also lead to bugs and security vulnerabilities.
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of type information, e.g., to distinguish array variables from scalar
variables, or to ensure that dereferences of an address-valued quan-
tity are compatible with the type of the objects to which it refers.
For machine-code programs, making such assumptions is un-
reasonable: (i) An access on a local variable is compiled to an
instruction operand that dereferences a computed address. For
instance, if local variable x is at offset –12 from the activation
record’s frame pointer (register ebp), an access on x would typi-
cally be turned into an operand [ebp–12], which dereferences the
computed address ebp–12. (ii) Type information may not be avail-
able for the objects to which an address-valued quantity refers.
DASH does not require a preprocessing step of points-to anal-
ysis, and it does handle pointer arithmetic to some extent. How-
ever, it still requires type information to distinguish pointer vari-
ables from scalar variables. In addition, equality and disequality
constraints between pointer values are used to identify an alias-
ing condition relevant to a speciﬁc property in a speciﬁc state. The
use of such aliasing conditions is central to DASH’s ability to per-
form veriﬁcation in the absence of a separate points-to analysis: the
aliasing conditions are acquired “on-the-ﬂy”—during the course of
veriﬁcation—instead of ahead of time.
Inmachine code, int-valued quantitiesand address-valued quan-
tities are indistinguishable at runtime, and arithmetic on addresses
is used extensively. This makes it challenging to deﬁne the appro-
priate notion of “aliasing condition” for use in MCDASH.
Byte-Addressable Memory: In x86 machine code, memory is
byte-addressable, and a sound analysis must be able to handle non-
aligned addresses.
Variables and Arrays: For source-level tools, an access to a
stack-allocated variable is not modeled as a dereference of a mem-
ory address. Programs in which the property of interest can be
proven while reasoning about only stack variables provide easy
cases for source-level tools. In machine code, however, such pro-
grams are not as easy because every access on a stack-allocated
variable is performed via a memory dereference.
Oneshortcoming ofDASH vis ` avismachinecode isthat ittreats
array accesses unsoundly (the way SLAM does). This allows the
DASH tool to avoid using the theory of arrays inside its theorem
prover (which improves the tool’s scalability). However, at the
machine-code level, memory looks like one large array.
For both of these reasons, it is challenging for a machine-code
model checker toachieve thesame degreeof scalabilityasasource-
code model checker.
Control Flow: Most front ends for processing a language’s
source code provide a reasonably accurate description of a pro-
gram’scontrol ﬂow(usingpoints-to-analysisresultstosupply miss-
ing information about the callees of an indirect function call).
Formachine-code analysis, thereare several reasons why recov-
ering control ﬂow is challenging.
• The branch condition isoften not explicit: many instruction sets
provide separate instructions for (i) setting ﬂags(based on some
condition thatistested) and(ii)subsequent branching according
to the values held by one or more ﬂags.
• It is often difﬁcult to identify the targets of indirect jumps and
indirect function calls [3].
MCDASH. MCDASH is based on the DASH algorithm of Beck-
man et al. [6]. DASH uses concrete testing along with symbolic
reasoning to ﬁnd either a test input that deﬁnitely causes a (bad)
target state to be reached, or a proof that the bad state can never be
reached. (The third possibility is that DASH may fail to terminate.)
In the MCDASH implementation, we use a technique due to
Lim et al. [30] to generate automatically some of the key primitives
from a description of the concrete semantics of an instruction set.
This creates (a) an emulator for running tests, (b) a primitive for
performing symbolic execution, and (c) a primitive for performing
weakest-liberal-precondition (WLP).
This provided a starting point for our work, but to create
MCDASH we still had to address all of the challenges discussed
above. In doing so, we restricted ourselves to use only language-
independent techniques. Consequently, the overall system acts as
a “Yacc-like” tool for creating versions of MCDASH for different
machine-code instruction sets: given a description of an instruc-
tion set, a MCDASH-based model checker is generated automati-
cally. This infrastructure has been used to generate two such model
checkers: MCDASH/x86 and MCDASH/PowerPC.
For a given instruction set, we can actually create three different
kinds of MCDASH model checkers:
MCDASH-ICFG: This version is useful in contexts in which it
is possible to create an accurate interprocedural control-ﬂow
graph (ICFG)—that is, when source code, a cooperative com-
piler, and/or symbol-table/debugging information are available.
In particular, MCDASH-ICFG uses the ICFG to build its initial
abstraction of the program’s state space. (In essence, it abstracts
states based on the value of the program counter.)
MCDASH-ICFG: Because it is not possible, in general, to build an
accurate ICFG for machine-code programs without assistance
from the compiler, MCDASH-ICFG uses an initial abstraction
of the state space that is coarser than the ICFG. It consists of
three abstract states deﬁned by the predicates “PC = start”, “PC
= target”, and “PC 6= start ∧ PC 6= target” (where “PC” denotes
the program counter). MCDASH-ICFG reﬁnes this abstraction
during the course of state-space exploration.
MCDASH-SMC: This version is capable of verifying (or detecting
ﬂaws in) self-modifying code (SMC). (Self-modifying code is
used in runtime code generation, code-encryption schemes, and
OS boot loading. It is also used in malware.)
Thework described in thepaper makes the following contributions:
1. MCDASH extends DASH in several ways.
(a) MCDASH does not require any preprocessing analysis, such
as points-to analysis, alias analysis, and control-ﬂow anal-
ysis; nor does it require information that identiﬁes the pro-
gram’s variables or their types.
(b) Wedeveloped alanguage-independent way for MCDASH to
identify the aliasing condition relevant to a speciﬁc property
in a speciﬁc state.
(c) We developed a way to speed up MCDASH—without im-
pacting soundness—using atechnique fromconcolic execu-
tion: some symbolic values are replaced with concrete val-
ues taken from the concrete state. This reduces the size and
complexity of the formulas sent to the theorem prover.
(d) We introduced several optimizations to regain some of the
scalability lost by moving to a low-level language.
2. We extended MCDASH to deal with self-modifying code
(SMC). This is not possible with most other model checkers
because they make a premature—and, in general, unsound—
commitment to the ICFG as an abstraction of a program’s state
space. As far as we know, MCDASH-SMC is the ﬁrst model
checker to address verifying (or detecting ﬂaws in) SMC.
Organization. The remainder of the paper is organized as fol-
lows: §2 reviews the DASH algorithm for model checking source-
code. §3 describes MCDASH-ICFG, our simplest approach to ex-
tending the DASH algorithm to work on machine code. §4 de-
scribes MCDASH-ICFG, which can be used when it is not pos-
sible to start with an accurate ICFG of a machine-code program.
§5 presents MCDASH-SMC, which addresses self-modifying code.
§6 describes how a language-independent MCDASH implementa-
tion was created. §7 presents some experiments carried out with
MCDASH/x86. §8 discusses related work.
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Input: An abstract graph G with start and target nodes.
Input: A set of concrete traces T.
1: if target has a witness in T then
2: return reachable
3: end if
4: Find a path τ in G from start to target.
5: if no path exists then
6: return not reachable
7: end if
8: Find the last edge (n,m) of τ such that n has a witness c in T.
9: Let I be the instruction on edge (n,m).
10: Symbolically execute the concrete trace to c and then I.
11: Let S be the symbolic state obtained.
12: if S is feasible then
13: Find program input from S, run test, and add trace to T.
14: else
15: Reﬁne G at node n.
16: end if
2. Background on DASH
This section provides an overview of how the DASH algorithm [6]
operates on source code. Given a program and a target label (a
particular control location in the program), DASH either returns
a test case whose execution leads to the target, or a proof that the
target is unreachable (or DASH does not terminate).
While DASH is running, it maintains an approximation of the
program’s state space. The approximation is represented as a graph
with edges labeled with program statements or program conditions,
and nodes labeled with formulas. We call such a graph an abstract
graph. One of the nodes in the graph is designated to be the start
node (where program execution starts) and another node is desig-
nated as the target (representing the target label). DASH also stores
a set of concrete traces T that are obtained from running tests. A
concrete statein T issaid tobe awitness for anode nin theabstract
graph if it satisﬁes the formula that labels node n.
DASH proceeds iteratively. During each iteration, it either runs
a test (in an attempt to reach the target) or reﬁnes the abstract graph
by splitting nodes and removing certain edges (in an attempt to
prove that the target is not reachable). If the graph has no path from
start to target, then DASH has proved that target is unreachable, and
the abstract graph serves as the proof. An informal description of a
single DASH iteration is shown in Alg. 1.
We will explain the algorithm using the program shown in
Fig. 1(a) as an example, and describe how DASH proves or dis-
proves the reachability of each of the labels L1, L2, and L3. First,
suppose that the target is L1. DASH starts with an abstract graph
G that is the control-ﬂow graph (CFG) of foo, shown in Fig. 1(b),
and all nodes are labeled with the formula true. It initializes T by
running a random test. For our example, the only input to the pro-
gram is the value of x. DASH chooses a random value for x, say 10,
and runs a test. This produces a trace of concrete states that witness
nodes of G. The presence of a witness for a node of G is shown in
Fig. 1(b) as an “×” inside the node.
In the ﬁrst iteration, step 1 does not ﬁnd a witness for L1. Next,
step 4 ﬁnds the path τ = foo start
y=x+1 − − − − − → n1
y==1 − − − − → L1. In
steps 8 and 9, the node n is n1, and I is assume(y == 1). Step 10
performs symbolic execution.
A symbolic state has two components: a path constraint and a
symbolic map. The initial symbolic state has path constraint true
and a symbolic map that assigns a symbolic constant to the input:
[x 7→ x0]. Symbolic execution proceeds by building formulas
and expressions over the symbolic constants. The execution of the
assignment y = x + 1 does not change the path constraint, but
changes the symbolic map to [x 7→ x0,y 7→ x0 + 1]. The next
statement gathers up a path constraint: it equates the current value
of y with 1, leading to the constraint x0 + 1 == 1, which is
conjoined to the existing path constraint.
Thus, in step 11, the symbolic state has path constraint x0 +
1 == 1 and map [x 7→ x0,y 7→ x0 + 1]. A symbolic state is
feasible if and only if its path constraint is feasible. In this case, it
is feasible under the assignment x0 = 0. This provide a new test
case, and foo is executed with x initialized to 0. During the second
iteration, step 1 ﬁnds that L1 has a witness: the test reaches L1.
Now suppose that the target is L2. As before, DASH starts with
Gas the CFG of foo and runs a random test with, say, xassigned to
10 again (so that Fig. 1(b) still describes the initial situation). In the
ﬁrst iteration, τ is the (unique) path from foo start to L2. In steps
8 and 9, DASH considers the frontier (n3,assume(z == 0),L2).
Symbolic execution yields the path constraint (x0+1 6= 1∧2x0 =
0), which is unsatisﬁable (assuming integer arithmetic, to keep the
discussion simple). In this case, DASH reﬁnes G. Next, we explain
how DASH carries out its reﬁnement, in general, and will then
continue with our example.
The triple (n,I,m), where node n and instruction I are the
ones chosen in steps 8 and 9, and m is the successor node of I,
is called the frontier: node n is the last place (along the currently
chosen path) at which a concrete witness has been seen, and DASH
tries to push a test beyond I in the hope that it might lead to the
target. When this is not possible, the abstract graph G is reﬁned
by splitting node n into n
0 and n
00, as shown in Fig. 1(c). The
reﬁnement operation allows some non-connectivity information to
be represented in G; in particular, reﬁnement is performed in such
a way that the reﬁned graph records that n
0 is not connected to m
(see Fig. 1(c)).
Let ψ be the formula that labels m, c be the concrete witness
of n, and Sn be the symbolic map obtained from the symbolic
execution of τ up to n. DASH chooses a formula ρ, called the
reﬁnement predicate, and splitsnode ninton
0 andn
00 todistinguish
the cases when n is reached with a concrete state that satisﬁes ρ
(n
00) and when it is reached with a state that satisﬁes ¬ρ (n
0). This
predicate is chosen such that
(i) no state that satisﬁes ¬ρ can lead to a state that satisﬁes ψ after
the execution of I, and
(ii) the symbolic map Sn satisﬁes ¬ρ.
The ﬁrst condition ensures that the edge from n
0 to m can be
removed, and the second condition rules out the possibility of
extending the current path along I (forcing the search to explore
different paths). It also ensures that c is now a witness for n
0 and
not n
00 (because c satisﬁes Sn)—and thus the frontier during the
next iteration must be different. One possibility for the reﬁnement
predicate is to choose the weakest liberal precondition (WLP) of ψ
with respect to I. Other possibilities are discussed below.
Returning to the example of how node n3 is reﬁned across the
frontier (n3,assume(z == 0),L2), DASH chooses the reﬁnement
predicate (z == 0)∧true, which simpliﬁes to z == 0. This leads
to the abstract graph shown in Fig. 1(d). (The concrete witnesses
are again shown as ×’s.)
This case, when I is of the form assume(ϕ), is one in which
DASH chooses a reﬁnement predicate other than ρ1
def = WLP(I,ψ)
(where ψ is the formula that labels m). The reason is that
WLP(assume(ϕ),ψ) equals ϕ ⇒ ψ [29]. For instance, in the
example above, ρ1 would be WLP(assume(z == 0),true) =
((z == 0) ⇒ true), which simpliﬁes to true. However, in keeping
with condition (i) above—i.e., states that cannot satisfy ψ after the
execution of I should satisfy ¬ρ—we use the stronger reﬁnement
predicate ρ2
def = (ϕ ∧ ψ). This shifts all states that satisfy ¬ϕ to the
reﬁned node labeled with ¬ρ2 (e.g., n
a
3 in Fig. 1(d)). For instance,
3 2009/6/4void foo(int x) {
y = x + 1;
if(y == 1) L1: return;
z = 2 * x;
if(z == 0) L2: return;
y = bar(y);
if(x != y) L3: return;
}
int bar(int a) {
return (a-1);
}
foo_start
n1: true
L1 : true
n2: true
n3: true
L2 : true
n4: true
n5: true
L3 : true
y = x + 1
y != 1
y == 1
z = 2 * x
z == 0
z != 0
y = bar(y)
x != y 
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z == 0 z != 0
¥
¥
¥
¥
¥
n3
b: z == 0
z = 2 * x
z != 0
foo_start
n1: true
n2
a : x ≠ 0
n3
a: z ≠ 0
L2 : true n4: true
y = x + 1
y != 1
z = 2 * x
z == 0 z != 0
¥
¥
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z != 0
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b: x == 0
y != 1
foo_start
n1
b: y == 1 
∨ x ≠ 0
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a: x ≠ 0
n3
a: z ≠ 0
L2 : true n4: true
y = x + 1
y != 1
z = 2 * x
z == 0 z != 0
¥
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¥
¥
¥
n3
b: z == 0
z = 2 * x
z != 0
n2
b: x == 0
n1
b: y ≠ 1
∧ x ==0
y != 1
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Figure 1. (a) An example program. (b) Initial abstract graph created by DASH, with witnesses shown using “×”. (c) General DASH
reﬁnement. (d)–(f) The abstract graphs after different iterations of DASH. (To reduce clutter, nodes that cannot reach L2 are omitted.)
in Fig. 1(d) all states that satisfy z 6= 0 are excluded from node n
b
3.
Because n
a
3 is not connected to L2, reﬁnement via ρ2 = (ϕ∧ψ) al-
lows the reﬁned abstract graph to represent more information about
non-connectivity of states than it would have via ρ1 = (ϕ ⇒ ψ).
In the next iteration, τ is chosen to be
[foo start,n1,n2,n
b
3,L2], and the frontier is at node n2.
While performing symbolic execution, the formulas that label
the nodes are picked up in the path constraint: i.e., if the current
symbolic map is S and φ is the formula on the current node, then
φ is evaluated (similar to a branch condition) and conjoined in the
path constraint. In our example, the formula that labels n
b
3 will be
picked up, leading to the same path constraint as before (which
means that the current path cannot produce a concrete witness for
n
b
3). Reﬁnement is performed at n2, leading to the graph shown
in Fig. 1(e). This continues, ﬁnally leading to the graph shown in
Fig. 1(f). (In the last iteration, the reﬁnement predicate turns out to
be false, and nodes labeled with false are deleted from the abstract
graph.) This graph proves that L2 is unreachable.
Reﬁnement Predicate. In the presence of pointers, choosing the
right reﬁnement predicate is the key. Suppose that the frontier
(n,I,m) has statement I = *p = 5 and that the formula on m
is ψ = (x + y == 10). Then WLP(ψ,I) is
p == &x ∧ p == &y ∧ (5 + 5 == 10)
∨ p == &x ∧ p 6= &y ∧ (5 + y == 10)
∨ p 6= &x ∧ p == &y ∧ (x + 5 == 10)
∨ p 6= &x ∧ p 6= &y ∧ (x + y == 10)
This formula has four disjuncts, each for a different aliasing con-
dition. DASH deﬁnes an aliasing condition α as a conjunction
of equality and disequality constraints between addresses that are
written to when executing the program statement (i.e., p) and ones
that are used in the formula (i.e., &x and &y).
In general, if the statement writes to just one address but the
formula has n addresses, then there are 2
n possible aliasing con-
ditions. The key insight that allows DASH to operate efﬁciently in
the presence of pointers is that it chooses the reﬁnement predicate
based on aliasing conditions that actually arise in the program ex-
ecution. It looks at Sn, which represents a collection of concrete
states that actually arise during program execution, and derives α
from it. The intuition behind this approach is that one does not ex-
pect too many aliasing conditions to arise at a particular point in the
program. Thus, considering them lazily makes the overall process
efﬁcient.
Intheexample above, suppose thatSn is[p 7→ &x,···], andthe
addresses of x and y are distinct. Then α = (p == &x∧p 6= &y).
DASH chooses the reﬁnement predicate WLPα(I,ψ) = ¬α∨(α∧
WLP(I,ψ)). The latter term (α ∧ WLP(I,ψ)) selects only one
conjunct from WLP out the the exponentially many that it may
have. This allows DASH to avoid the exponential blowup. One can
verify that WLPα is a valid reﬁnement predicate.
Interprocedural Analysis. Now suppose that the target is L3.
DASH operates as before, except when the frontier is a call state-
ment. In its ﬁrst iteration, DASH splits node n5 using the reﬁne-
ment predicate x 6= y. In the next iteration, the frontier is the call
to procedure bar.
At a frontier, DASH essentially needs to determine whether a
test could go beyond the frontier. Thus, in this case, it needs to
ﬁnd out if the execution of bar can produce a concrete state that
satisﬁes the formula ψ = (x 6= y). It does this by recursively
calling itself on procedure bar: the target is set to be the WLP of
ψ across the assignment of the return value of bar to y, which is
ψ
0 = (x 6= a). This is done by splitting the exit node of bar into
two nodes, one labeled with ψ
0 and the other with ¬ψ
0. The former
node is set as the target node. The constraints on parameters of
bar are obtained from the symbolic state Sn4 that is obtained from
symbolically executing the concrete trace up to node n4.
Thus, the recursive call to DASH is obligated to start from a
state [a 7→ x0 + 1,x 7→ x0] with (x0 + 1 6= 1 ∧ 2x0 6= 0), and
must prove or disprove ψ
0 at the end of bar. If this call to DASH
returns a test case, then the frontier inside foo can be extended
using the same test; otherwise, it proves that ψ
0 cannot be reached,
in which case a reﬁnement is performed at the frontier in foo. The
reﬁnement predicate is obtained from the proof that is returned by
DASH(see [6] for details). Inour example, the reﬁnement predicate
would be (x 6= y + 1).
During interprocedural analysis, additional care has to be taken
because there are now two targets: the split exit node labeled with
ψ
0, as well as the global analysis target. On a given iteration, DASH
may use a path in the abstract graph G to either target.
Checking Safety Properties. We have only described DASH for
when the goal istotest the reachability of agiven program location.
However, DASH can handle general safety properties as well: if
one wants to verify if the formula ϕ is ever violated during the
execution of the program, then all nodes of theinitial abstract graph
aresplit into two, one labeled withϕ and theother labeled with¬ϕ.
All nodes labeled with ϕ are treated as the target node. MCDASH
is also able to do the same, but we limit the discussion to properties
that check the reachability of a single program location.
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We now describe how to extend the DASH algorithm to work
on machine code. The starting point is Alg. 1, which has four
requirements:
1. access to an interprocedural control-ﬂow graph (ICFG), which
is used to build the initial abstract graph
2. a method to perform concrete execution of the program for
running tests
3. a method to perform symbolic execution of a given program
path (a sequence of program statements)
4. a method to compute WLPα, which is used when reﬁning the
abstract graph.
In our ﬁrst version of MCDASH, called MCDASH-ICFG, we as-
sume that the ICFG of the machine-code program is provided
to us. In particular, the MCDASH-ICFG implementation uses the
CodeSurfer/x86 front end to build CFGs. (This assumption is
dropped in §4 and §5.)
3.1 A Language-Independent Approach to WLPα
Lim et al. showed how to create primitives for concrete execution
and symbolic execution of machine code [30]. Their work provides
items 2 and 3 listed above. They also showed how to create a
primitivefor weakest liberal precondition (WLP), but that primitive
causes the predicates that label the nodes of the abstract graph to
explode.
In this section, we describe our language-independent approach
to identifying “aliasing condition” α, as well as the WLPα primi-
tive that goes along with it.
3.1.1 α and WLPα
As mentioned in §1, there are two challenges in deﬁning an appro-
priate notion of aliasing condition for use with machine code.
• int-valued quantities and address-valued quantities are indistin-
guishable at runtime, and
• arithmetic on addresses is used extensively.
Suppose that the frontier is (n,I,m), ψ is the formula on m,
and S is the symbolic state for the path up to n. For source code,
aliasing condition α can be derived by looking at the relationship,
in S, between the addresses written to by instruction I and the
ones used in ψ [6]. However, this way of computing α is language-
dependent because the semantics of the language of instructions
must be incorporated into the algorithm, to determine “the ad-
dresses written to by instruction I”.
In contrast, we developed an alternative, language-independent
approach both to identifying α and computing WLPα. For the mo-
ment, to simplify the discussion, suppose that a concrete machine-
code state is represented using two maps M : INT → INT and
R : REG → INT. Map M represents memory, and map R repre-
sents the values of machine registers. (A more realistic deﬁnition
of memory is considered in §3.1.2.)
We use the standard theory of arrays to describe updates and
accesses on maps, e.g., update(M,k,d) denotes the map M with
index k updated with the value d, and access(M,k) is the value
stored at index k in M. We also use the standard axiom from the
theory of arrays:
access(update(M,k1,d),k2) = ite(k1 = k2,d,access(M,k2)),
(1)
where ite is an if-then-else term. We use the notation R(r) as a
shorthand for access(R,r).
Consider the following machine-code example, which is similar
to the source-code example discussed in §2. Suppose that I is
“mov [eax], 5” (which corresponds to *eax = 5 in source-code
notation), and ψ is (M(R(ebp) − 8) + M(R(ebp) − 12) = 10).
Also, suppose that under the symbolic state S, R(eax) equals
R(ebp) − 8.
1
First, we symbolically execute I starting from the identity sym-
bolic state Sid = [M 7→ M0,R 7→ R0]. This results in the sym-
bolic state S
0 = [M 7→ update(M0,R0(eax),5),R 7→ R0]. Next,
we evaluate ψ under S
0—i.e., perform the substitution ψ[M ←
S
0(M),R ← S
0(R)]. For instance, the term M(R(ebp) − 8)
evaluates to the contents of memory at address R(ebp) − 8, i.e.,
access(M,R(ebp) − 8), which equals
access(update(M0,R0(eax),5),R0(ebp) − 8).
From the axiom for arrays, this simpliﬁes to
ite(R0(eax) = R0(ebp) − 8,5,M0(R0(ebp) − 8)).
Thus, the evaluation of ψ under S
0 yields



ite(R0(eax) = R0(ebp) − 8,
5,M0(R0(ebp) − 8))
+ ite(R0(eax) = R0(ebp) − 12,
5,M0(R0(ebp) − 12))


 = 10 (2)
This formula equals WLP(I,ψ) [30].
The process described above illustrates a general property: for
any instruction I and formula ψ,
WLP(I,ψ) = ψ[M ← S
0(M),R ← S
0(R)],
where S
0 = SEJIKSid and SEJ·K denotes symbolic execution [30].
The next steps are to identify α and to create a simpliﬁed for-
mula ψ
0 that weakens WLP(I,ψ). These are carried out simulta-
neously during a traversal of WLP(I,ψ). We illustrate this on the
example discussed above. Because the ite-terms in Eqn. (2) were
generated from array accesses, ite-conditions represent the desired
aliasing conditions. We traverse Eqn. (2), and for each term of the
form ite(ϕ,t1,t2), if ϕ holds in symbolic state S, then it is con-
joined to α, and the term is simpliﬁed to t1. Otherwise, if ¬ϕ holds
in S, then ¬ϕ is conjoined to α and the term is simpliﬁed to t2. If
neither case holds, then the ite term and α are left untouched.
In our example, R0(eax) equals R0(ebp)−8 in symbolic state
S; hence, applying the process described above to Eqn. (2) yields
ψ
0 = (5 + M0(R0(ebp) − 12) = 10)
α =
￿
(R0(eax) = R0(ebp) − 8)
∧ (R0(eax) 6= R0(ebp) − 12)
￿
(3)
The formula ¬α ∨ ψ
0 (i.e., α ⇒ ψ
0) is the desired reﬁnement
predicate WLPα(I,ψ).
This approach is language-independent because it isolates the
consideration of the semantics of the instruction set to the compu-
tation of S
0 = SEJIKSid in WLP(I,ψ). All remaining steps are
performed solely on formulas.
2
Itistruethatthealgorithmdescribed abovecomputes WLP(I,ψ)
explicitly. However, this step alone does not cause an explosion in
formula size—explosion is a consequence of repeated application
of WLP. In our approach, the formula obtained via WLP(I,ψ) is
immediately simpliﬁed to create ﬁrst ψ
0 = α ∧ WLP(I,ψ) and
then α ⇒ ψ
0.
1In x86, ebp is the frame pointer, so if program variable x is at offset –8
and y is at offset –12, this corresponds to the example discussed in §2, with
eax playing the role of variable p.
2DASH and MCDASH need the symbolic-execution primitive SEJIK any-
way for other steps of state-space exploration. Moreover, an implementa-
tion of SEJIK can be generated from a description of the semantics of an
instruction set [30]; consequently, an implementation of WLPα(I,ψ) can
be generated as well.
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In the above discussion, we assumed that the memory map has type
INT → INT. In x86 machine code, memory is byte-addressable,
so the actual type of the memory map is INT32 → INT8. This
complicates matters because accessing (updating) a 32-bit quantity
in memory under the little-endian storage convention translates
into four contiguous 8-bit accesses (updates); for instance, a 32-bit
access can be expressed as follows:
access 32 8 LE 32(m,a) =
let v1 = Int8To32ZE(m(a))
v2 = Int8To32ZE(m(a + 1)) ￿ 8
v3 = Int8To32ZE(m(a + 2)) ￿ 16
v4 = Int8To32ZE(m(a + 3)) ￿ 24
in (v4 | v3 | v2 | v1)
(4)
where Int8To32ZE converts an INT8 to an INT32 by padding the
high-order bits with zeros, and “|” denotes bitwise-or.
Let update 32 8 LE 32 denote the similar operation for updat-
ing a map of type INT32 → INT8 under the little-endian storage
convention. Note that when 1 ≤ |k1 −INT32 k2| ≤ 3, we no longer
have the property
access 32 8 LE 32(update 32 8 LE 32(M,k1,d),k2)
= access 32 8 LE 32(M,k2).
and hence it is invalid to simplify formulas by the rule
access 32 8 LE 32(update 32 8 LE 32(M,k1,d),k2)
⇒ ite(k1 = k2,d,access 32 8 LE 32(M,k2)).
However, thefour single-byteaccesses onminEqn. (4)(i.e.,m(a),
m(a+1),m(a+2),and m(a+3)),are access operations for which
it is valid to apply Eqn. (1).
Returning to the example discussed in §3.1.1, where R0(eax)
equals R0(ebp)−8in symbolic state S, we perform the same steps
as before. First, the symbolic execution of I = mov [eax], 5
starting from the identity symbolic state Sid = [M 7→ M0,R 7→
R0] results in the symbolic state
S
0 = [M 7→ update 32 8 LE 32(M0,R0(eax),5),R 7→ R0].
The formula ψ is now written as follows:
access 32 8 LE 32(M,R(ebp) − 8)
+ access 32 8 LE 32(M,R(ebp) − 12)
= 10.
To obtain WLP(I,ψ), we evaluate ψ under S
0, which yields the
formula shown in Fig. 2—where for brevity we have introduced
the notational shorthands p = R0(eax), x = R0(ebp) − 8, y =
R0(ebp)−12, ∗x = M0(R0(ebp)−8),∗y = M0(R0(ebp)−12),
etc. The formula shown in Fig. 2 is the analog of Eqn. (2).
The step that uses symbolic state S to identify α and create a
simpliﬁed formula ψ
0 that weakens WLP(I,ψ) is now applied to
the formula shown in Fig. 2, and produces
ψ
0 def = 5 +

 

2
24 ∗ Int8To32ZE(∗(y + 3))
| 2
16 ∗ Int8To32ZE(∗(y + 2))
| 2
8 ∗ Int8To32ZE(∗(y + 1))
| Int8To32ZE(∗y)

 
 = 10,
and α is the conjunction of the disequalities collected from the
formula shown in Fig. 2:
α
def = x + 3 6= p + 3 ∧ ...x + 3 6= p ∧ ...x 6= p + 3 ∧ ...x 6= p
∧ y + 3 6= p + 3 ∧ ...y + 3 6= p ∧ ...y 6= p + 3 ∧ ...y 6= p.
These are the analogs of Eqn. (3).
As before, the formula ¬α ∨ ψ
0 (i.e., α ⇒ ψ
0) is the desired
reﬁnement predicate WLPα(I,ψ).
3.2 Local Variables
In this section, we describe an optimization necessary to improve
the scalability of MCDASH-ICFG. Consider the program shown
in Fig. 3. When DASH is executed on the source code to test
reachability of the label ERR, it will perform reﬁnement in its
ﬁrst two iterations. Next, it recursively calls itself on procedure
bar with the target predicate φ
1
src = (g + l1 = 5). Inside bar,
the ﬁrst iteration again performs reﬁnement to build the formula
φ
2
src = (g + l1 + l2 = 5).
The story changes when dealing with machine code. When we
run MCDASH-ICFG on procedure foo, it does some reﬁnements
to build the formula φ
1
mc = (M(cg) + M(ebp − 4) = 5) at the
corresponding point to φ
1
src (which is just after the call to bar).
Here, cg is the (constant) global address of the variable g.
Next, MCDASH-ICFG, like DASH, recursively calls itself on
bar. Ignoring the return instruction, the ﬁrst iteration would have
the instruction “pop ebp” as the frontier, and would need to reﬁne.
The semantics of this instruction are that it assigns ebp the value
M(esp) and then increments esp by 4. Performing WLPα on φ
1
mc
results in (M(cg) + M(M(esp) − 4) = 5). The formula created
at the point corresponding to φ
2
src would be (M(cg) + M(ebp −
4) + M(M(ebp) − 4) = 5).
Note that the formula generated by MCDASH has a double
memory dereference, even though the source code contains only
ordinary accesses on variables. The reason for thisisthat MCDASH
does not know that ebp is a callee-saved register in this program:
at the pop instruction, it does not know that the value of ebp is
restored to its value before the call to bar.
To reduce the complexity of the formulas that arise, we extend
the notion of “α” to include the values of esp and ebp. If the
frontier is (n,I,m) with Sn as the symbolic state, then in the
computation of WLPα we check Sn to see if the values of esp and
ebp are concrete (they may be symbolic). If they are concrete—
say cs and cb—then we conjoin the constraint (R(esp) = cs ∧
R(ebp) = cb) to α, and replace these registers with their constant
values in the reﬁnement predicate. Thus, φ
1
mc would become
(R(ebp) = (cstk − 4)) ⇒ (M(cg) + M(cstk − 8) = 5),
where cstk is the starting value of esp. The result of WLPα on this
formula across the pop instruction is:
(R(esp) = cstk − 60) ∧ (M(cstk − 60) = cstk − 4) ⇒
(g + M(cstk − 8) = 5)
The reﬁnement predicate at the point corresponding to φ
2
src is:
(R(ebp) = cstk − 60) ∧ (M(cstk − 60) = cstk − 4) ⇒
(M(cg) + M(cstk − 64) + M(cstk − 8) = 5)
By this means, the double memory dereference goes away, and the
reﬁnement predicate looks more like φ
2
src, except that it has an extra
constraint on the program stack.
The intuition behind using theconcrete values of esp and ebp is
similar to the intuition behind using aliasing condition α in WLPα:
the program is not expected to generate too many different aliasing
conditions at a given program point, and its use greatly simpliﬁes
the reﬁnement predicates. Similarly, at a particular program point
in a given calling context, esp and ebp should not take on too
many different values—in particular, in well-behaved programs
they should each take on only a single value.
4. MCDASH-ICFG
In some cases, especially for stripped binaries, it is not possible to
build an accurate description of the CFG of the program, without a
full reasoning of the program’s semantics. Difﬁculties such as indi-
rect jumps and indirect calls also show up in high-level languages.
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


2
24 ∗ Int8To32ZE(ite(x + 3 = p + 3,0,ite(x + 3 = p + 2,0,ite(x + 3 = p + 1,0,ite(x + 3 = p,5,∗(x + 3))))))
| 2
16 ∗ Int8To32ZE(ite(x + 2 = p + 3,0,ite(x + 2 = p + 2,0,ite(x + 2 = p + 1,0,ite(x + 2 = p,5,∗(x + 2))))))
| 2
8 ∗ Int8To32ZE(ite(x + 1 = p + 3,0,ite(x + 1 = p + 2,0,ite(x + 1 = p + 1,0,ite(x + 1 = p,5,∗(x + 1))))))
| Int8To32ZE(ite(x = p + 3,0,ite(x = p + 2,0,ite(x = p + 1,0,ite(x = p,5,∗x)))))




+




2
24 ∗ Int8To32ZE(ite(y + 3 = p + 3,0,ite(y + 3 = p + 2,0,ite(y + 3 = p + 1,0,ite(y + 3 = p,5,∗(y + 3))))))
| 2
16 ∗ Int8To32ZE(ite(y + 2 = p + 3,0,ite(y + 2 = p + 2,0,ite(y + 2 = p + 1,0,ite(y + 2 = p,5,∗(y + 2))))))
| 2
8 ∗ Int8To32ZE(ite(y + 1 = p + 3,0,ite(y + 1 = p + 2,0,ite(y + 1 = p + 1,0,ite(y + 1 = p,5,∗(y + 1))))))
| Int8To32ZE(ite(y = p + 3,0,ite(y = p + 2,0,ite(y = p + 1,0,ite(y = p,5,∗y)))))




= 10
Figure 2. The formula for WLP(I,ψ), where ψ is update 32 8 LE 32(M,R(ebp) − 8) + update 32 8 LE 32(M,R(ebp) − 12) = 10,
obtained by evaluating ψ on the symbolic state S
0 = [M 7→ update 32 8 LE 32(M0,R0(eax),5),R 7→ R0]. For brevity, the following
notational shorthands are used in the formula: p = R0(eax), x = R0(ebp) − 8, y = R0(ebp) − 12, ∗x = M0(R0(ebp) − 8),
∗y = M0(R0(ebp) − 12), etc.
int g = 0;
void foo( ) {
v1 = 10;
bar( );
g += v1;
if(g == 5)
ERR: return;
}
void bar( ) {
int v2 = 20;
g += v2;
}
procedure foo
. push ebp ; save frame ptr on stack
. mov ebp, esp ; ebp = esp
. sub esp, 56 ; make space for locals
. mov [ebp-4], 10 ; v1 = 10
. call bar ; bar ( )
. mov eax, g ; eax = g
. add eax, [ebp-4]; eax += v1
. mov g, eax ; g = eax
. cmp g, 5 ; g == 5?
. jnz short loc 5D; jump if g != 5
. ERR: nop ; skip
. loc 5D:
mov esp, ebp ; restore stack ptr
. pop ebp ; restore frame ptr
. retn ; return to callee
procedure bar
. push ebp ; save frame ptr on stack
. mov ebp, esp ; ebp = esp
. sub esp, 56 ; make space for locals
. mov [ebp-4], 20 ; v2 = 20
. mov eax, g ; eax = g
. add eax, [ebp-4]; eax += v2
. mov g, eax ; g = eax
. mov esp, ebp ; restore stack ptr
. pop ebp ; restore frame ptr
. retn ; return to callee
Figure 3. An example program and its compiled x86 binary.
However, more acute is the problem of identifying procedures, be-
cause a binary need not follow any standard calling convention. For
example, a program can use a return instruction to simulate a pro-
cedure call, and vice versa. For this reason, MCDASH-ICFG does
not use a front-end for building a CFG.
One standard approach in the model-checking literature is to
treat the program counter (PC) as data and use the CFG shown in
Fig. 4(a), where opany denotes any possible instruction (it stands
for an abstraction of all possible instructions). However, using this
approach with DASH has two difﬁculties: (i) A path in the abstract
graph only conveys information about the number of instructions
executed, not what those instructions are. Thus, during symbolic
execution, if thePC value becomes asymbolic expression, then one
would need to symbolically execute all of the possible instructions
at PCs represented by the symbolic expressions. This can easily
overwhelm the tool. (ii) The entire program would be treated as a
single procedure. The interprocedural aspect of DASH is important
for its scalability. We show how to solve each of these problems,
in turn. For the ﬁrst one, we show how one can make use of a
technique from concolic execution [34, 21].
4.1 Stealing Concrete Values
In concolic techniques for state-space exploration, the symbolic
execution of a path τ can steal values from a concrete execution
of τ to simplify the symbolic state. This has previously been used
as a heuristic in tools for boosting test coverage. We show how to
adapt the technique to work in a veriﬁcation context. We explain
the concept in source-level terms.
DASH usessymbolic execution tolearnanunder-approximation
of the program’s behavior. We observe that one can relax the re-
quirements of symbolic execution. Consider step 11 of Alg. 1, and
suppose that τ is the path (sequence of instructions) that the con-
crete execution took to reach state c. Let SEJτKSid be the symbolic
state obtained after symbolically executing the path τ from the ini-
tial identity symbolic state. The DASH algorithm remains correct,
while ensuring progress, if the following two properties are satis-
ﬁed: (i) S = SEJτKSid generalizes c, i.e., there is some assignment
to the input symbolic constants for which S equals c, and (ii) if
S
0 = SEJτ;IKSid is feasible then the path τ;I must be executable.
The ﬁrst property ensures that if reﬁnement is performed, then the
frontier changes in the next iteration. (In particular, it ensures that
c is not a witness for n
0 in Fig. 1(c).) The second property ensures
that if S
0 is feasible, and we run a test using the input obtained
from S
0, then the test must follow (τ;I)—and thus make progress
towards the target. Next, we show how stealing concrete values still
preserves these two properties.
Example. Suppose that I
0 = (z = x << y) has to be symbolically
executed, where << is the bitwise left-shift operator. If the current
symbolic state has path constraint ϕ and symbolic map Sbefore =
[x 7→ f(inp),y 7→ g(inp)], for some functions f and g over the
input symbolic constants, then the result of executing I updates the
value of z to (f(inp)<<g(inp)).
In concolic execution, one avoids creating complex symbolic
expressions (because the theorem prover has to later check for
satisﬁability of formulas over these expressions) by using concrete
information. Suppose that we wish to avoid having a symbolic
value for theshift-argument of <<. Then, if theconcrete statebefore
the execution of I
0 is [y 7→ 2,···], concolic execution techniques
would “steal” the value of y from the concrete state [34] and
simplify the resulting symbolic map to:
Safter = [x 7→ f(inp),y 7→ g(inp),z 7→ f(inp)<<2]
This technique does not satisfy the latter of the two properties
mentioned above: if inp has just one symbolic constant s0, f =
(s0 + 1),g = s0, ϕ = true, I
0 was the last instruction of τ, and I
is a branch that tests (z == 4), then executing I on the symbolic
state Scon results in the path constraint (s0 + 1)<<2 == 4, which
is satisﬁable with s0 == 0. Running a test with this input would
result in the concrete state cbefore = [x 7→ 1,y 7→ 0] before I
0
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Figure 4. Abstract graphs created by MCDASH-ICFG
(obtained by substituting 0 for s0 in Sbefore). After the execution of
I
0, the branch I cannot be taken.
For MCDASH, we change the process of stealing concrete val-
ues. Whenever the concrete value of a variable y is stolen, say it is
cy, then the symbolic map is updated as before, but the constraint
y == cy is symbolically evaluated and added to the path con-
straint. In the above example, the constraint y == 2 evaluates to
s0 == 2 under Sbefore, and is conjoined to ϕ. The reader can verify
that the execution of I will result in an infeasible state. The basic
idea behind our approach is to treat the process of stealing con-
crete values as if there was a ﬁctitious branch condition y == cy
in the path. The concrete execution certainly satisﬁes this branch
and proceeds through it, and the symbolic execution picks up the
appropriate constraint, which also allows it to simplify its symbolic
map.
For MCDASH-ICFG, the symbolic execution keeps stealing the
value of the PC from the concrete state at every step. This ensures
thatthesymbolicmapalways hasaconcrete valueforthePC,hence
it only has to symbolically execute a single ﬁxed instruction at each
step.
4.2 Interprocedural without CFGs
The abstract graphs constructed by DASH at any stage only refer to
nodes of a single procedure. This allows it to keep these graphs
to a manageable size. In the absence of any information about
procedures, MCDASH-ICFG would have to use a single graph to
capture the abstraction of an entire program.
Weavoidthisproblembydeﬁningprocedural contexts(CTXTs),
which serve as a substitute for the notion for a procedure. There is
one context CTXT(v) for each possible value v of the PC. The
context CTXT(v) roughly serves as a procedure identiﬁer for the
one that begins at PC = v. The concrete state of the program is
instrumented with a stack of CTXTs that is manipulated by the
concrete execution. We use c.stk to refer to the stack associated
with concrete state c.
If a test has to be started from state c, and PC(c) = v, then c.stk
is initialized to [CTXT(v)]. If the execution of a call instruction
takes state c1 to c2 then c2.stk = push(CTXT(PC(c2)),c1.stk).
If the execution of a return instruction takes state c3 to c4 then
c4.stk = pop(c3.stk), provided c3.stk has at least two elements.
In all other cases, the stack is left unchanged. (For well-behaved
programs, this stack identiﬁes the current procedure along with its
calling context.) Similar manipulation is performed for symbolic
execution. We add an additional type of constraint in our logic:
ctxt(v), which is satisﬁed by a concrete state c only when the top
element of c.stk is CTXT(v).
The initial abstract graph constructed by MCDASH-ICFG is
shown inFig. 4(b). Inthe graph, opcall isan abstraction of all call in-
structions, opret is an abstraction of all return instructions, and opint
is all other instructions. Thus, MCDASH-ICFG knows the CTXT-
stack manipulations that each of the three kinds of instructions can
perform.
During the execution of MCDASH-ICFG, suppose that the fron-
tier has opcall as the instruction, the formula on its target is ϕ, and
the concrete state at its source is c. The ﬁrst step is to identify the
procedure being called. If the next instruction executed by c is not
a call instruction, then we reﬁne using the predicate PC == vc,
where vc is the PC value of c. This reﬁnement will result in the re-
moval of the opcall edge (because no call instruction can ﬁre from a
state that satisﬁes PC == vc). Otherwise, let ve be the PC after the
call instruction is executed at c. We steal the PC value ve using the
method discussed in the previous section. Next, MCDASH-ICFG
calls itself recursively on the abstract graph shown in Fig. 4(c) to
see if ϕ is reachable or not. In essence, we use call and return in-
structions to ﬁgure out contexts that MCDASH should verify in iso-
lation.
5. MCDASH-SMC
For self-modifying code (SMC), the association of a PC value with
the instruction at that PC is no longer ﬁxed. Weextended MCDASH
to incorporate the decoding relationship between a sequence of
bytes in memory and the instruction that those bytes represent.
To do this two strategies were possible; however, with the present
MCDASH implementation we were only able to try the ﬁrst:
1. Similar to MCDASH-ICFG, we simplify the cases when the
PC value or the bytes in memory at that PC are symbolic
expressions. During symbolic execution, we steal the PC value
as well as the memory bytes at that PC from the concrete state.
This preserves soundness, and ensures that symbolic execution
only has to execute a ﬁxed instruction at each step (i.e., if
MCDASH-SMC returns a proof that a property holds, then it
indeed holds).
2. The alternative is to only steal the PC values, but allow the in-
struction to be symbolic. To accomplish this, the decoding re-
lationship (byte-sequence to instruction), as well as the instruc-
tion semantics would need to be expressed symbolically so that
symbolic execution can form expressions and constraints over
them. We leave this approach for future work.
Except for the above change, the MCDASH-SMC algorithm is
identical to MCDASH-ICFG.
MCDASH-SMC can verify the compiled version of the C code
shown in Fig. 5
3. The variable inp is the input to the program. The
array code stores the binary encoding of the instructions shown
in comments above it. This code increments the value of register
ecx. main calls this code, and after it returns, code is modiﬁed to
change the immediate argument of the add instruction to −1. Thus,
the next time code is executed, the value of ecx is decremented by
1.
MCDASH-SMC is able to verify that target label ERR is not
reachable. In MCDASH-ICFG, predicates of the form (PC == v)
help it learn control-ﬂow information because nodes of the abstract
graph that have such a constraint only have ﬁxed successors (unless
the instruction at that PC is call, return or an indirect jump). Simi-
larly, in MCDASH-SMC, the predicates that help build control-ﬂow
information are of the form (PC == v) ∧ decode(v,I), where the
latter is a constraint that the contents of the memory at location v
represent instruction I. For the example in Fig. 5, MCDASH-SMC
is able to pick up the constraints (PC == c) ∧ decode(c, “add
ecx, 1”) and (PC == c)∧decode(c, “add ecx, -1”), allowing
it to explore the possibility of executing different instructions at the
same PC.
3This example is adapted from the one described in http://www.acm.
org/src/Joy/joy.htm
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* add ecx, 1;
* retn;
*/
unsigned char code[] = {0x83,
0xc1, 0x01, 0xc3};
void main(int inp) {
int old = inp;
asm { mov ecx, inp }
((void(*)())code)();
code[2]=0xff;
((void(*)())code)();
asm { mov inp, ecx }
if(inp != old) {
ERR: return;
}
Figure 5. Self-Modifying Code
6. Implementation
The MCDASH implementation has been structured so that it can
be retargeted to different languages easily. The core components of
the system are language-independent in two different dimensions:
1. The MCDASH driver implements Alg. 1. It is structured so that
one only needs to provide an implementation of the concrete
and symbolic execution of a language, and a few other primi-
tives (e.g.,WLPα). Consequently, thiscomponent of the system
can be used for source-level languages or for machine-code lan-
guages.
2. For machine-code languages, we have used two tools that gen-
eratetherequiredimplementation oftheconcrete semanticsand
the symbolic-analysis primitives from descriptions of the syn-
tax and semantics of an instruction set of interest.
The abstract syntax and concrete semantics of an instruc-
tion set are speciﬁed using a language called TSL (Transformer
Speciﬁcation Language) [31]. Decoding (i.e., translation of binary-
encoded instructions to abstract syntax trees) is speciﬁed using
a tool called ISAL (Instruction Set Architecture Language).
4 The
relationship between ISAL and TSL issimilarto therelationship be-
tween Flex and Bison. With Flex and Bison, a Flex-generated lexer
passes tokens to a Bison-generated parser. In our case, the TSL-
deﬁned abstract syntax serves as the formalism for communicating
values—namely, instructions’ abstract syntax trees—between the
two tools.
Compared with other speciﬁcation languages for instruction
sets, TSL has one unique feature: from a single speciﬁcation of
the concrete semantics of an instruction set a multiplicity of static-
analysis, dynamic-analysis, and symbolic-analysis components can
be generated automatically. The TSL system consists of two parts:
• The TSL language for specifying an instruction set’s abstract
syntax and concrete semantics. TSL is a strongly typed, ﬁrst-
order functional language with a datatype-deﬁnition mecha-
nism for deﬁning recursive datatypes, plus deconstruction by
means of pattern matching.
• The TSL compiler, which translates a speciﬁcation to a com-
mon intermediate representation (CIR). The CIR generated for
a given TSL speciﬁcation is a C++ template that can be used to
create multiple analysis components by instantiating the tem-
plate in different ways.
TSL has two classes of users: (1) instruction-set speciﬁers, and
(2) analysis developers. The former use the TSL language to spec-
ify the concrete semantics of different instruction sets; the latter
create new analyses by instantiating the CIR in different ways.
Specifying an Instruction Set. Much of what an instruction-set
speciﬁer writes in a TSL speciﬁcation is similar to writing an in-
terpreter for an instruction set in ﬁrst-order ML [24]. One speciﬁes
(i) the abstract syntax of the instruction set, by deﬁning the con-
4ISAL also handles other kinds of concrete syntactic issues, including (a)
encoding (abstract syntax trees to binary-encoded instructions), (b) parsing
assembly (assembly code to abstract syntax trees), and (c) assembly pretty-
printing (abstract syntax trees to assembly code).
structors for a (reserved, but user-deﬁned) type instruction; (ii) a
type for concrete states, by deﬁning—e.g., for 32-bit Intel x86—
the type state as a triple of maps:
state : State(INT32 → INT8, reg32 → INT32, ﬂag → BOOL);
where INT32 and INT8 refer to 32-bit and 8-bit integers, respec-
tively, and reg32 and ﬂag refer to a type for the names of 32-bit
registers and a type for the names of condition-codes, respectively;
and(iii)theconcrete semanticsof eachinstruction bywritingaTSL
function
state interpInstr(instruction I,state S) { ... };
Semantic Reinterpretation. Each analysis is deﬁned by rein-
terpreting the constructs of the TSL meta-language. TSL’s meta-
language supports aﬁxedsetof base-types; aﬁxedsetof arithmetic,
bitwise, relational, and logical operators; and a facility for deﬁning
map-types. An analysis developer deﬁnes a new analysis compo-
nent by (i) redeﬁning (in C++) the TSL base-types (INT32, INT8,
BOOL, etc.), and (ii) redeﬁning (in C++) the primitive operations
on base-types (+INT32, +INT8, etc.). These are used to instantiate the
CIR template. This implicitly deﬁnes an alternative interpretation
of each expression and function in an instruction-set’s concrete se-
mantics (including interpInstr), and thereby yields an alternative
semantics for an instruction set from its concrete semantics.
For MCDASH, TSL is used to create several useful reinterpreta-
tions of an instruction set:
• By instantiating the CIR with a reinterpretation that performs
the standard interpretation (in C++) of the TSL operators, we
obtain the instruction interpreter for concrete execution.
• By instantiating the CIR with a reinterpretation that instantiates
INT32, INT16, and INT8 as the types of symbolic expressions
that denote 32-bit, 16-bit, and 8-bit values, respectively, in the
input language of an SMT solver, and operations (such as +,
*, ==, etc.) as simplifying constructors
5 we obtain a semantics
suitable for symbolic execution. (In our implementation, we
used the Yices input language [18].)
• A third reinterpretation creates a primitive for performing WLP
[30]. (As explained in §3.1, WLP is used a subroutine in the
implementation of WLPα.)
These reinterpretations are used as subroutines in MCDASH’s com-
ponents for concrete execution, symbolic execution, and WLP
computation.
In MCDASH-ICFG, decoding of instructions is done all at once,
atICFG-constructiontime.InMCDASH-ICFG andMCDASH-SMC,
decoding of instructions is performed instruction-by-instruction, as
concrete or symbolic execution proceeds.
7. Experiments
We designed our experiments to test how competitive MCDASH is
against source-level tools. We compared against DASH on exam-
ples from [23]
6 on which an earlier version of DASH was tested.
These are hand-crafted examples designed to illustrate various as-
pects of the DASH algorithm. The later version of DASH [6] was
tested on device drivers. We could not use these examples because
we did not have the harnesses and the OS stubs for the drivers.
The examples are all written in C. We compiled them and ran
MCDASH-ICFG and MCDASH-ICFG on the resulting object ﬁle
(without using the symbol-table information). The source code
does not use pointers, but the compiled binary manipulates ad-
dresses to access local variables from the stack. The results are
5Straightforward simpliﬁcations are performed; e.g., a == a simpliﬁes to
true, etc.
6These are available from that paper’s author’s homepage http://www.
cse.iitb.ac.in/~bhargav/synergy.
9 2009/6/4shown in Fig. 6. Comparing with the timing numbers in [23],
MCDASH is in the same range, except for a couple of examples.
Moreover, surprisingly, MCDASH-ICFG was sometimes faster than
MCDASH-ICFG. This was because the absence of a CFG forced its
search to proceed in a different manner than MCDASH-ICFG. And,
as a result, it got lucky in ﬁnding the desired loop invariants faster.
8. Related Work
Machine-Code Analyzers Targeted at Finding Vulnerabilities.
A substantial amount of work has been carried out on analysis
techniques to detect security vulnerabilities by analyzing source
code for a variety of languages [36, 11, 32, 37]. Less work has
been done on vulnerability detection for machine code. Kruegel
et al. [27] developed a system for automating mimicry attacks.
Theirtool uses symbolicexecution of x86machine code todiscover
attacks that can give up and regain execution control by modifying
the contents of the data, heap, or stack so that the application is
forced to return control to injected attack code at some point after a
system call has been performed. Cova et al. [14] used this platform
to apply symbolic execution to the problem of detecting security
vulnerabilities in x86 executables.
Both Godefroid et al. [22] and Brumley et al. [7] have cre-
ated tools for performing concolic execution on x86 machine code.
Concolic execution combines concrete execution and symbolic ex-
ecution with the goal of ﬁnding inputs that increase test coverage.
Calls to an SMT solver are used to obtain inputs that force previ-
ously unexplored branch directions to be taken. In contrast, DASH
and MCDASH combine concrete execution and symbolic execution
with abstraction; they are goal-directed: they try to refute the claim
that there is no path from program entry to a given goal state.
Inaddition, the implementations of the other machine-code ana-
lyzers cited above are x86-speciﬁc, whereas our work can be retar-
geted to a new instruction set merely by writing a TSL speciﬁcation
and applying the TSL compiler.
Self-Modifying Code. The work on MCDASH-SMC addresses a
problem that has been almost entirely ignored by the PL research
community. There is one paper on SMC by Gerth from 1991 [20],
andonerecent paper byCaietal.[9].However, bothof thosepapers
concern proof systems for reasoning about SMC.
In contrast, MCDASH-SMC can analyze SMC automatically.
As far as we know, MCDASH-SMC is the ﬁrst model checker to
address verifying (or detecting ﬂaws in) SMC. It is also possible to
generate versions of MCDASH-SMC for different instruction sets
from descriptions of an instruction set’s syntax and semantics.
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